Security. Surveillance. Diversity. Balance. These have been the contradictory catchwords of the Right’s attacks on academia since 9/11. Couched in the language of nationalism and advocating a hyperscopic regime of control through state and civil apparatuses, different right-wing organizations professing commitment to fairness and diversity have sought to regulate the work of postcolonialist Middle East studies scholars. Thus Daniel Pipes’s Web site, Campus Watch, published dossiers of eight prominent professors of Middle East studies who demonstrated “bias” in their teaching and promoted anti-Americanism. The targeted eight were inundated with hate mail and death threats. Although Pipes removed the dossiers after vigorous criticism from faculty nationwide, he continued Campus Watch’s project “Monitoring Middle East Studies on Campus.” Each month, the Web site showcases a “Quote of the Month” that demonstrates the “terrorist” sympathies of a Middle East studies professor. The stated objective of Campus Watch is to redress the “intolerance of alternative views” within Middle East studies.¹

In September 2003, members of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Select Education approved H.R. 3077, the International Studies in Higher Education Act, which authorized the creation of an advisory board, appointed by the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, to oversee the curricula of area studies centers that received funding from Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1965. Curricula, it was stated, needed to better reflect the needs of national security.² Expert testimony for the act came from its tireless promoter, Stanley Kurtz, fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution and editor of National Review. Alarmed at the purported anti-Americanism of postcolonial theory–influenced Middle East studies, Kurtz singled out the pernicious consequence of the writings of Edward Said and recommended federal oversight over these centers. His recommendations: balance and diversity.

Such a blacklisting of professors and state surveillance of academics, in addition to the mushrooming of faculty-policing organizations such as Students for Academic Freedom (SAF), which boasts chapters in more than 130 institutions, demonstrate a victory of the Right’s attempt to
contain resistance and discipline academia into becoming an ideological apparatus of the security state. Undoubtedly, such inroads into academia have precedents, most recently in McCarthyism. However, the current incursions into academia are markedly different in two striking ways: first, the Right’s appropriation of the language of multiculturalism; and second, its concern not simply with the political affiliations and activities of academics as was typical of McCarthyism, but with the very paradigms of knowledge production such as postcolonial theory. I suggest that the current attack on area studies, particularly on Middle East studies, is a response to the decolonization of knowledge consequent upon worldwide independence movements of the 1960s, a decolonization that boosted racial struggles within the country. Today, with many on the Right arguing for the United States to unequivocally don the mantle of empire, anticolonial critiques have become suspect. Despite the use of the language of multiculturalism, the Right’s offense is a frontal assault on civil rights and the culture of civil rights. In what follows, I will examine the different contexts of the debates surrounding area studies’ legislation in order to understand the complex relationships between the university, political culture, the state, and the macronarratives of imperialism and decolonization. The essay will demonstrate the vexed nature of academic freedom through area studies’ relationship to the state and imperialism. I argue that the deployment of the language of multiculturalism is part of the state’s attempt to subsume the raced subject into a nationalist narrative of pluralism and consensus useful for imperialism; further, what is distinct after 9/11 is the state’s use of insidious distinctions between the multicultural and the foreign. Finally, I will suggest the imbrication between academic freedom and the decolonization of knowledge.

The broad underpinnings of my argument are that academic practices within the U.S. university, particularly those of the humanities and social sciences, cannot be understood without their relationship to imperialism, which has structured the production of knowledge through different apparatuses, Orientalism being perhaps the most intransigent. Yet, if the university is an integral part of the modern world system, which, with the United States as center, continues today to perpetuate a neocolonial globalization, in tandem with a military-style imperialism and a resurgence of Orientalism, it is also a changed scene of colonial difference where subaltern knowledges are gaining currency. Walter Mignolo describes a modern/colonial world system, a period extending from the fifteenth century to the global colonialism of the present, as one premised on the process of subalternizing all non-European knowledges. That process, he argues, began changing in the mid-twentieth century, when centers and periph-
eries were no longer far apart and new forms of knowledge that had been subalternized and considered important only as objects of study began to emerge as “loci of enunciation.” Colonial difference, once “out there,” away from the center, is now all over “in the peripheries of the center and in the centers of the periphery” and is the space where the coloniality of power is enacted and where “the restitution of subaltern knowledge is taking place.” The U.S. university, I contend, is such a space of colonial difference, where the decolonizing of knowledge, indeed the subalternizing of European knowledge, has been taking place. The state, constituting itself as empire through sovereign (rather than only disciplinary) power, especially since 9/11, is particularly eager to challenge and neutralize this restitution of subaltern knowledge. The current relationship between subaltern knowledge and the state (along with its right-wing allies) cannot therefore be explained through narratives blind to colonial difference such as governmentality (Foucault), state of exception (Agamben), or for that matter corporatization/neoliberalism alone but through the additional macronarrative of imperialism, undergirded by racial othering.

**Academia and the State: The Case of Area Studies**

Despite what seems like a pernicious state encroachment into Middle East studies as revealed in the now temporarily quashed H.R. 3077 (resurrected under H.R. 609, the College Access and Opportunity Act), area studies has always been associated with the interests of the nation. When the American Oriental Society, which we might see as a regional precursor of area studies, established itself in 1843, it clearly affiliated itself with missionary activity, long seen as a signifier of imperial power. In his opening address to the society, John Pickering stressed the close relationship between the scholarly study of oriental languages and literatures and missionary activity, deeming the former a “means of disseminating religious instruction,” as befitting a major nation. Thus area studies, in its guise as oriental studies, clearly saw itself as an arm of missionary imperialism, a trend that continued in the early twentieth century. K. S. Latourette, who helped establish East Asian studies at Yale, authored *The Christian Missions in China* (1929), while A. C. Coolidge, who designed Slavic studies at Yale, published *The United States as a World Power* (1908).

By midcentury, the strategic national value of area studies seemed self-evident to scholars. The Committee on World Regions of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) reported in 1943, for instance, that “the immediate need for social scientists who know the different regions
of the world stands second only to the demand for military and naval officers familiar with the actual and potential combat zones.” In 1946, Army Specialized Training Programs for languages emerged at Princeton and the universities of Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. And in 1952, Hans Morgenthau would write in the *International Social Science Bulletin*, “Area studies are frequently motivated by the recognition of America’s predominant place in world affairs, which necessitates a knowledge of the world with which the United States must deal.” By the 1950s, area studies were being generously funded by the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford Foundations. Indeed, the most spectacular boost to area studies was engendered by Cold War politics. The launching of the first Sputnik in 1957 propelled Congress to pass the National Defense Education Act (NDEA). Under Title VI of the NDEA, area studies centers were funded in universities, thus formalizing the material and political basis for the relationship between area studies and the state. By the early 1960s, eight of the Title VI centers had been framed to study the modern Middle East. The early leaders of Middle East studies were no dissenters; they saw their discipline as an armature of Anglo-American policy. As Philip Hitti, founder of the program in Near Eastern studies at Princeton, argued, American universities were the most vital force for shaping Near East societies in their struggle against communism from the outside and feudalism from within.

By the 1960s, area studies had been recruited to become the policy equivalent of what Said ascribed to Orientalism as a discursive formation: a means of disciplining and domination. The particular kind of disciplining envisioned by the state and often subscribed to by area studies practitioners was specifically colonial, hostile to independence movements in the third world and popular socialist revolts in South America. The directives of Project Camelot, funded by the U.S. Army and which sought to solicit social systems models for predicting and influencing social changes in developing countries, made this clear:

The many programs of the U.S. Government directed toward this objective are often grouped under the sometimes misleading label of counterinsurgency (some pronouncable term standing for insurgency prophylaxis would be better). This places great importance on positive actions designed to reduce the sources of disaffection which often give rise to more conspicuous and violent activities disruptive in nature. The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of nation building as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active insurgency problems.
Moves toward decolonization or popular movements against repressive right-wing regimes were viewed as hostile to U.S. interests, and under no circumstances could people’s “sources of disaffection” be linked to the regimes themselves. Even though Project Camelot was canceled by the U.S. Congress after it aroused public protests in Chile, scholars expressed a variety of opinions on its goals.

While the goals of Project Camelot, often agreed to by area studies scholars, expressed the state’s antagonism toward worldwide decolonization, Middle East scholars were similarly skeptical of if not hostile to national liberation movements. Reflecting on the state of Middle East studies in 1978, Edward Said located this colonial mindset to the Orientalization of the other endemic to the field. Middle East experts who advise policy makers, Said wrote,

are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person. . . . The Orientalist now tries to see the Orient as an imitation West which, according to Bernard Lewis, can only improve itself when its nationalism “is prepared to come to terms with the West.” If in the meantime the Arabs, the Muslims, or the Third and Fourth Worlds go unexpected ways after all, we will not be surprised to have an Orientalist tell us that this testifies to the incorrigibility of Orientals and therefore proves that they are not to be trusted.  

Most Middle East studies scholars, like U.S. policy makers, could thus be counted on to have no sympathy for the cause of Palestinian sovereignty, which would always be associated with terrorism.

Yet, to see area studies scholars as merely acquiescent to the imperatives of the state or to see state directives as successfully containing dissent is to problematically think of power as absolute. Elements of resistance constantly erupted from the very attempts to mandate area studies to serve the state. Indeed the requirement of the NDEA to have its scholarship recipients sign loyalty oaths and noncommunist affidavits stirred the ire of many academics, who voted noncompliance with the order.  

In what was perhaps the most subversive working of the Ford Foundation fellowships, based on an implicit acceptance of the United States as world hegemon, the Africa grant was given to Immanuel Wallerstein, who would subsequently produce his masterly treatises on imperialism as central to the capitalist world system. It is this kind of decolonization of knowledge that the Right has resisted all through the 1970s, and most virulently since the overt attempts to suppress criticisms of the state after 9/11.
Third-World Liberation and the Decolonization of Knowledge

It is worth recalling that what Mignolo calls the “restitution of subaltern knowledge” at the peripheries of the center was initiated in the United States most dramatically through racially disenfranchised students who sought both to extend the imperatives of civil rights into education and to link their struggles to those of third-world decolonization. The Third World Movement, which began at San Francisco State College in 1968, comprised African Americans, Latinas/os, Asian Americans, and Native Americans, all of whom declared ghettos and barrios to be internal colonies of the United States and who modeled themselves after third-world liberation struggles. The founding of race-based academic programs, now loosely covered under the umbrella term “multiculturalism,” is directly attributable to the demands raised by these students. Similarly, the Black Panther Party grounded its demands in a critique of U.S. imperialism and saw the subjugation of African Americans as analogous to that of the Vietnamese under U.S. occupation. Indeed, a major imperative of the Black Panther Party, one initiated by Huey Newton, was to educate the “colonized” African Americans about their rights within the laws of the nation, particularly their rights to protection from police harassment in the streets of Los Angeles. (The initiative was subsequently institutionalized as the Miranda law.) The project of multicultural education thus emerged from a context of struggles over access to material resources and was tied to the inevitably linked goals of recognition and redistributive justice for the colonized within the United States. Multiculturalism implied affirmative action. The goal of race-based programs, developed as a result of demands by students of the Third World Movement, was to decenter Eurocentrism in the academy and bring to the fore race as a systemic form of oppression, legislated through the juridical apparatuses of the nation-state and normalized through different ideological apparatuses. The academy, particularly in the humanities, thus became a nexus through which civil rights, the decolonization of knowledge, and the critique of imperialism could powerfully intersect.

Nowhere was this synergy perhaps more powerfully apparent than in Middle East studies, where the mapping of the Middle East had traditionally served to discipline the field to the imperatives of colonialism and imperialism. Methodologically, Orientalism and a chronopolitics that denied coevalness to the other were accepted paradigms. Middle East cultures were seen as a rich storehouse of timeless wisdom from which the present had degenerated. With the entry of social scientists into the arena following World War II, the U.S. version of developmentalism or
modernization theory built upon Orientalist assumptions about Arab backwardness and added to it policy recommendations about how to enable Middle Eastern countries to reduplicate Western societies. Paradigmatic of this line of scholarship was Daniel Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (1958), which categorically stated, “What the West is . . . the Middle East seeks to become.”  

Well into the 1960s and continuing today, Orientalist scholars of the Middle East have continued to downplay the significance of imperialism, proclaiming like Bernard Lewis that “in the Middle East the impact of European imperialism was late, brief, and for the most part indirect.” As Stanley Kurtz, the major advocate of H.R. 3077, and Martin Kramer, who produced the anti-postcolonial polemic *Ivory Towers on Sand*, both argue, Said’s *Orientalism* radicalized Middle East studies and shook its colonial foundations. Analyses of imperialism’s role in scholarship on the Middle East were legitimized, resulting in a stringent reevaluation of earlier scholarship and the production of works like Timothy Mitchell’s *Colonizing Egypt* (1988), which turned the Orientalist mirror back on Europe. By the mid-1990s, scholars like Ghassan Salame and Saad Eddin Ibrahim were challenging the social science experts of the 1970s by emphasizing the diversity of Muslim societies and challenging the view of Islam as a degenerate force; yet others, like Avi Shlaim, were demonstrating the disastrous consequences of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

But while the impact of *Orientalism* on the field is undeniable, it was prepared for and, in a sense, anticipated by the critiques of Middle East studies produced in the aftermath of civil rights and the Vietnam War and which led to the formation of scholarly organizations critical of the complicity of the Middle East with U.S. imperialism: the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) in 1971 and the Alternative Middle East Studies Seminar (AMESS) in 1977. However, the impact of *Orientalism* might not have been as potent had it not been for the changed composition of Middle East studies scholars. And it is vital to emphasize that this change was an integral consequence of civil rights. The 1965 Immigration Act, which fundamentally deracialized new immigration, was championed by advocates of civil rights and was seen as an extension of the movement to end legal discrimination based on race; in the eyes of a rapidly decolonizing world, it was also seen as a step toward legitimizing U.S. Cold War claims to represent the “free” world.

Although cynical detractors of postcolonial theory have derided the supposed subaltern status of what they see as privileged third-world immigrant academics in the United States, there is little doubt that the migration of intellectuals from the periphery to the center or south to north challenged the intellectual foundations of area studies, which were predicated on colonial
racial-cultural hierarchies. What I am tracing here is not a simple identity politics (which the Bush administration has been happy to exploit and the D’Souzas of the world happy to explode), but I am not throwing out the “politics” of race either.

Thus I see the attempted surveillance of area studies by the state and the continued intimidation of Middle East studies faculty by the Right as, in one sense, responses to the gains of the civil rights era. Martin Kramer’s *Ivory Towers on Sand*, touted by the neocons as an authoritative text on Middle East studies, particularly suitable for the security state, is especially clear in its disapproval of both the global migration encouraged by the 1965 Immigration Act and of civil rights themselves. It is worth quoting Kramer at length here: “It [Orientalism] became a manifesto of affirmative action for Arab and Muslim scholars and established a negative predisposition toward American (and imported European) scholars. In 1971, only 3.2 percent of Middle East area specialists had been born in the region, and only 16.7 percent had the language and foreign-residence profiles coincident with a Middle Eastern background. ‘Our membership has changed over the years,’ announced MESA’s [Middle East Studies Association] president in 1992, ‘and possibly half is now of Middle Eastern heritage.’”

Referring to Said’s assessment of MESA as that of “a metropolitan story of cultural opposition to Western domination,” Kramer continues: “In fact, so total an ‘ideological transformation’ in MESA (which even named Said an honorary fellow) would not have taken place had there not been a massive shift in the ethnic composition of Middle Eastern studies.”

Similarly, Norvell B. De Atkine and Daniel Pipes lament the “indigenization [that] has changed MESA from an American organization interested in the Middle East to a Middle Eastern one that happens to meet in the United States.” “Scholars of the Middle East,” they argue, “are . . . infected with ‘county-itis’—identifying more with their subjects than with the United States.”

While there is obviously a simplistic identity politics at play in the assumption that Americans (a category that clearly excludes Arab Americans) and Europeans are unaffected by the intellectual challenges of decolonization or by the same token that every Arab American or Arab living in the United States has revolutionary sympathies, it is the case that the shift in Middle Eastern studies from Orientalism to anticolonialism, this decolonization of knowledge was facilitated, as it was in literary studies, by the entrance into the academy of scholars of third-world origins.

However, Kramer’s diatribe against the changes in intellectual paradigms is also clearly an argument against civil rights. For Kramer, the virtual invisibility of native scholars in the apartheid of Middle East area studies in the 1970s is no cause for alarm. Instead, the corrective two decades later, when the ratio of native to nonnative scholars is even,
becomes a case of egregious favoritism. The marginal gains of equal opportunity get viewed as carte-blanche access. In the vein of right-wing diatribes on white male victimage (to which Susan Faludi in *Stiffed* became an unwitting contributor), Kramer views the entry of scholars of Middle Eastern heritage into MESA as a disenfranchisement of white scholars. Affirmative action becomes the oxymoronic reverse discrimination and, recalling earlier periods of immigration panic, “massive” hordes of Arabs create a brown peril for MESA. Of course, the question Kramer does not ask is why Arab scholars in the United States are scarcely represented in fields such as American studies, gender studies, or British literature. Is the relatively strong representation in MESA symptomatic of a ghettoization wherein Arab scholars are allowed entry only into certain areas, whereas other areas are heavily policed, and where entry might demand a certain kind of cultural capital? You are OK as an “Arab,” but please don’t try to teach Shakespeare. Kramer would go further: you are welcome as long as you fit the accoutrements of the “Arab” we understand and we need only so many native informants.

If the decolonization and civil rights movements of the 1960s created an activist citizenry committed to the agenda of social and racial justice, and whose demands created social welfare programs designed to counter racial oppression, the Right’s program begun in the Reagan years and continued thereafter in the arguments of the neocons has been to roll back the reforms of those years and declare the goals of those movements (economic redistribution and political representation) inimical to the national good. Witness George H. W. Bush’s analysis of the Los Angeles riots as caused by welfare programs rather than racial disenfranchisement. In the post-9/11 security state, activist citizenship has been declared not only unnational but a threat to the security of the nation. It is telling that Ann Coulter’s 2003 invective against liberal policies is titled *Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism*. The pedagogical narrative of nation is one of ostensible racial diversity and ideological consensus. This diversity, based on an ethnicity concept of race in which everyone is ethnic, equally positioned, and included in the national narrative, supports a neoconservative color blindness that appropriates diversity while denying structural inequalities. The popular-culture version of this phenomenon, one that resonates with the religious Right, is the *Left Behind* series, which conjoins doctrinal narrowness and unconditional support for U.S. imperialism with racial expansiveness. This ideological consensus, refashioning Cold War national agendas for the present, is succinctly captured in the central proposition of Project for a New American Century, that “American leadership is good both for America and the world.” The twin imperatives of color-blind inclusion and American global power have coalesced into what
I call a multicultural imperialism that seeks to regulate public discourse. Within this regulatory mechanism, radical, race-based multiculturalism, and critiques of imperialism, both legacies of civil rights and decolonization movements are deemed national security threats. The policing of area studies is thus twinned with an assault on the academic and cultural legacies of civil rights, which therefore necessitate a war on this culture. In this political climate, the resurgence of Orientalist discourse needs to be seen both as a means of legitimating the state’s global imperial project and as a means of normalizing colonial racial difference.

Kramer’s *Ivory Towers on Sand* leaves little doubt that the object of its attack is as much problems in Middle East studies as the legacies of civil rights culture in the academy, particularly civil rights’ association with decolonization movements. The receptivity of Middle East studies to postcolonial theory, Kramer writes, is consequent upon the “surge of the student left into the faculty ranks [who] took over the institutions of Middle Eastern studies.” Similarly, the preface to the book singles out for attack scholars in the area culpable of distorting Middle East studies. Predictably, these are described as “infused with third worldist biases” and “caught up in the passion of its discredited causes. There is a widespread sympathy for Middle Eastern radicalism and an abiding suspicion of America’s global role.”

In their attempts to affect legislation to monitor and control the activities of the academic Left, critics of Middle East studies have been joined by many other conservative organizations dedicated to purging academia of left influence. David Horowitz, who has been spearheading the Academic Bill of Rights, bemoans what he perceives as the preponderance of the Left in academia: “Marxists, socialists, post-modernists and other intellectual radicals . . . whose ideas of how societies work have been discredited by historical events . . . still dominate their academic fields.” He attributes left-wing influence to the unfortunate 1960s phenomenon of politicizing the undergraduate classroom. SAF, for instance, is clear about its policing of areas and programs developed as a result of 1960s initiatives. Under the pretext of monitoring faculty who are particularly partisan in their teaching, the handbook for SAF specifies the programs targeted for maximum surveillance: “Cultural Studies, American Studies, English literature, Women’s Studies, African-American (or Black) Studies, Chicano/Latino/Hispanic Studies, Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender Studies, American-Indian Studies, and Asian-American Studies.” The targets of SAF are the race- and gender-based programs advocated by students of the Third World Movement as well as programs like cultural studies and American studies that have been receptive to these areas.
It is crucial to recognize the current attempts to regulate academia, particularly in the humanities, as concerted attacks on civil rights culture and decolonization movements, because in their efforts to mobilize right-wing support for the stifling of dissent, all conservative surveillance organizations—the advocates of H.R. 3077, Campus Watch, proponents for the Academic Bill of Rights, and SAF—are strategically deploying the language of multicultural inclusion. The conservative agenda is presented as one of promoting balance, diversity, and tolerance in academia and purging universities of extremism and bias. Martin Kramer, who sounded the alarms about Middle East studies shortly after 9/11, argued that the area “lack[s] a culture of tolerance for diversity in ideas and approaches.”

Stanley Kurtz, the key expert witness for the consideration of H.R. 3077 who cites Kramer as his sole authority, continued Kramer’s strategy of advocating surveillance of Middle East studies under the guise of ushering in openness. Although Orientalism has been stringently critiqued by the president of MESA and other MESA scholars, even while it has had considerable influence, Kurtz buys wholesale Kramer’s assertion that MESA members are uncritical Saidian ideologues. Middle East studies, he argued, needed to “balance” the readings of Said and his like-minded colleagues with readings from Orientalists like Bernard Lewis; university faculties needed to be balanced among those who oppose and support U.S. foreign policy. He supported the “vigorous and open debate” and the importance of “divergent points of view” currently endangered through government funding of Title VI programs dominated by anti-Americanism.

Similarly, Campus Watch justifies its surveillance of Middle East studies on the grounds that the monolithically leftist bent of faculty in the area has resulted in a discipline that lacks intellectual diversity.

Perhaps the most ardent user of the rhetoric of multiculturalism for silencing the academic Left is David Horowitz, whose article on monitoring faculty to the extent of screening the posting of political cartoons on office doors is titled “In Defense of Intellectual Diversity.” Touting the consistent lack of representation by conservatives on university campuses (significantly, Horowitz does not visit business or medical schools) and the intellectual intimidation perceived by conservative students, Horowitz has sought to mobilize these students to press for academic bills of rights on their campuses by appropriating the language of radical multiculturalism: “I encourage them [conservative students] to use the language that the left has deployed so effectively in behalf of its own agendas. Radical professors have created a ‘hostile learning environment’ for conservative
students. There is a lack of ‘intellectual diversity’ on college faculties and in academic classrooms. The conservative viewpoint is ‘under-represented’ in the curriculum and on its reading lists. The university should be an ‘inclusive’ and intellectually ‘diverse’ community.”

Horowitz’s strategy is fascinating not only because of its illustration of classic Orwellian doublespeak, but also because it demonstrates the contradictions of race and the problematic politics of multiculturalism in the public arena today. Clearly, Horowitz’s injunctions to conservative students are based on an acknowledgment of the importance of civil rights agendas of the 1960s such as diversity, representation, and inclusion. On the other hand, material initiatives such as affirmative action have been vociferously opposed by all conservatives. Such a contradiction cannot simply be attributed to conservative hypocrisy; it is consequent also upon the move from radical to liberal multiculturalism.

As Omi and Winant have argued, the movement away from the radical, rights-based conception of race in the 1960s to ethnicity theory in the 1970s and 1980s meant that issues of systemic racism were replaced by those of assimilation, based on the immigrant paradigm that argued that all immigrants, regardless of color, went through similar adaptation processes. In practice, the ethnicity theory had two consequences: (a) purely recreational forms of identity, such as German American, could be seen as analogous to identities subject to systemic racism such as African American and Hispanic; (b) the immigration process could serve as a macronarrative for racial progress, where history from 1865 onward could be represented as a triumphal march of assimilation and adaptation. Indeed the latter vision of multicultural progress has become so favored a narrative of nation that racism, segregation, and exclusion are seen only as the purview of fringe groups such as neo-Nazis or the KKK. On the other hand, the continued systems of racial disenfranchisement, the hypersegregation of African Americans, for instance, from the former institutions of slavery and Jim Crow to contemporary versions such as the ghetto and the prison are disrecognized as systemic racism both by neoconservatives who attempt to defund any initiatives toward social justice and by liberals who acclaim color-blind notions of justice. This severance of race from rights across a broad sociopolitical spectrum has made it possible for multiculturalism today to simply represent a politics of cultural recognition, without recognition of equal social reward or redistributive justice.

This discourse of liberal multiculturalism has proven to be particularly amenable to conservative appropriation. As Satya Mohanty pointed out nearly a decade ago, while claims for diversity and difference in the 1960s had a political edge, they are now being used for conservative ends via a “state sponsored multiculturalism” that deflects attention from the mate-
The post-9/11 narrative of exceptional (and exceptionally victimized) empire has been consistently coded as multicultural empire for liberty.

Today, state-sponsored multiculturalism and militarist imperialism form an unholy alliance in what I have called a multicultural imperialism. Thus Stanley Kurtz’s criticisms of Edward Said’s theories as “biased” and “extreme” draw superficially on the language of multiculturalism in which all races are welcomed and where, implicitly, racism has no play — the talk-show model of multiculturalism where critical race theorists and KKK members are given equal weight. Horowitz’s rhetoric of balance and diversity draws upon a similar model. Indeed the marshaling of multiculturalism in the service of unilateral militaristic imperialism has been perfected by the Bush administration, which parades its united colors of empire (through a tokenism that suppresses exclusions and inequalities) in the figures of Condoleezza Rice, Alberto Gonzalez, Carlos Gutierrez, Alphonse Jackson, and Elaine Chao. Yet in the neocon clarion call for academic surveillance ostensibly to promote diversity, the imperative for academic knowledge to support U.S. imperialism is clear. Horowitz, for instance, passionately denounced the role of the “leftwing university” in “undermining American self-respect and self-confidence at a time when the nation was facing enemies who were deadly.” Indeed, Horowitz argues that the harboring of oppositional intellectuals in state-funded academic institutions is a public outrage. As evidence he cites the UCLA Senate’s April 2003 overwhelming condemnation of the invasion of Iraq after the United States had “liberated Iraq” and when 76 percent of the population supported the war. The implication is that such institutions are obliged to serve as alibis for state policy and unthinking reflectors of public opinion at its most jingoist. Similarly, Martin Kramer, who constantly condemns the lack of “a culture of tolerance for diversity in ideas and approaches” in Middle East studies, recommends simultaneously that scholars in the area should articulate “that which is uniquely American in the American approach to the Middle East. The idea that the United States plays an essentially beneficent role in the world is at the very core of this approach.”

Although the narration of the United States as an “empire for liberty” has a long-standing history going back to Jefferson, the post-9/11 narrative of exceptional (and exceptionally victimized) empire has been consistently coded as multicultural empire for liberty. Not only has this empire been continually narrated through the race and gender diversity of the armed forces, but also through highly publicized calls for tolerance such as George W. Bush’s characterization of the perpetrators of 9/11 as those belonging only to fringe groups of Islam and his broadcasts to the public, cautioning them not to target racial or religious groups. Yet while this pedagogical narrative of nation as empire for liberty is undoubtedly cast as one in service of all, a multicultural empire, the limits of nation
are carefully policed through inevitably raced distinctions between the benign domestic multicultural and the sinister foreign. The resurgence of Orientalism since 9/11 has only heightened the discursive consensus through which “Arab,” “Muslim,” “terrorist,” and “anti-American” signify each other. For the Middle Eastern community in the United States, this has meant that these minorities have been positioned as other, outside the imagined community of the nation whose interests, it is presumed, they threaten. Whereas the question “Where are you from?” had always cast Asian Americans as foreign by interrogating their right to be here, for Arab Americans since 9/11 there has been no question, but rather a stereotypical conviction: “I know where you’re from and what you’re like.” The multicultural, in other words, meets its limits where it becomes foreign, and “foreign” signifies “anti-American.” It was therefore no contradiction for Bush to proclaim tolerance while simultaneously giving free rein to the FBI to interrogate and arrest thousands of Middle Eastern men, and inciting citizens to engage in racial profiling by encouraging them to report all “suspicious activity.” No doubt, such an atmosphere legitimated the ultimate dismissal of Sami Al-Arian from his tenured faculty position at the University of South Florida.

Of course, not all foreignness signifies anti-Americanism — European immigrants and travelers are not racially profiled for terrorism—but any critique of U.S. imperialism is deemed a threat to the security of the nation and therefore viewed as unnational. (Postcolonial theory acquired this dubious distinction in the hearings for H.R. 3077.) At a certain level, the Left, through its critique of empire, intersects with the foreign in being cast as unnational. The foreignness and unnationalness of both the Left and the Middle Easterner go far to explain the monitoring of Middle East studies and of the academic Left in general. As mentioned earlier, Martin Kramer’s hostility to the “foreign” composition of scholars in MESA relies upon current associations of Middle Easterners with unnational foreignness. Stanley Kurtz’s testimony for H.R. 3077, which relies on Kramer’s argument about the pernicious and omnipresent influence of Edward Said and postcolonial theory on Middle East studies, similarly draws upon the discursive consensus that marks both anti-imperial critique and an Arab lineage as foreign, in order to characterize Said as outside imagined community of nation. Thus Said’s role as journalist for the Egyptian weekly Al-Ahram, and his excoriation of U.S. foreign policy therein, position him outside the nation both through the act of critique and through the circuit of foreignness that the Egyptian weekly provokes. Said’s foreignness is again at play in his by no means novel reading of the U.S. Constitution as raced. “He has belittled the reverence in which Americans hold the Constitution” by pointing out its “wealthy, white, slaveholding, Anglophilic”
male authorship.\textsuperscript{45} Kurtz’s statement demonstrates the narrow bounds of nation imagined by the Right. Not only is Said marked as foreign in relation to the national symbolic, but national subjects are implicitly defined through their sacralization of, rather than their engagement with, nation-making documents. As illustrated by David Horowitz, the nation must be teleologically narrated as multicultural triumph. Explaining the success of a recent speech, Horowitz writes, “I reminded them how a white slave-owner named Thomas Jefferson put into the founding document of this nation the revolutionary idea that all men are created equal and how within a generation as a direct result of the efforts of England and America slavery had been abolished in the Western world.”\textsuperscript{46}

Key to this equal opportunity, multicultural imperialism is therefore not to raise any questions about the endless war on terror and to recognize critique as treason. This delegitimation of complex, critical thinking and the equation of dissent with terrorism was spelled out in George W. Bush’s address to the nation: “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”\textsuperscript{47} Bush’s totalitarian Manichaeanism is echoed by conservatives such as Daniel Pipes promulgating academic surveillance. Thus Pipes’s illustration of hating America includes suggesting that the Iraqi invasion was motivated by the nation’s oil supply (Noam Chomsky) and that preemptive war was a return to the rule of the jungle (Eric Foner).\textsuperscript{48} No less opposed to intellectual debate was the November 2001 report of the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), in which unacceptable speech by faculty included comments such as “ignorance breeds hate” and “there needs to be an understanding of why this kind of suicidal violence could be undertaken against our country.”\textsuperscript{49} In this prohibitive cultural milieu, Orientalism as key cultural component to militaristic imperialism has witnessed a remarkable resurgence as a mechanism of control.

**Orientalism, Disciplining, and Middle East Studies:**

“The Muslims Are Coming!”

The marshaling of the language of multiculturalism for the purposes of ensuring that Middle East studies serves the ends of U.S. imperialism has been accompanied by a corresponding racheting up of discourses of Orientalism in the public arena. Based on a fundamental premise of racial-cultural difference between an enlightened West and backward others, the discourse of Orientalism has been a bulwark to justifications of colonialism and imperialism. September 11 ushered in a virtual renaissance of Orientalist discourses in which empire was not only justifiable but neces-
Middle East studies scholars who have attempted to decolonize scholarship by seeking alternatives to the representation of Arabs either as creatures of unchanging timeless societies or as irrationally crazed ones (especially those that seek nationalism/decolonization) find themselves particularly under fire.

Thus it is not surprising that Daniel Pipes, the founder of Campus Watch, relies on the most overt of Orientalist categories—the Arabs as subhuman and filthy—to serve racial difference. In an essay for National Review appropriately titled “The Muslims Are Coming! The Muslims Are Coming!” Pipes concurs with the religious Right in worrying about the influx of Muslims into the West, particularly because of the low birthrate in Western countries and the excessive fertility of Muslims. This Muslim peril, echoing late-nineteenth-century paranoia of the yellow peril, is diagnosed by Pipes as the major danger facing Western countries. Pipes writes, “In contrast to Westerners, who are not able even to maintain their present numbers . . . Muslims revel in some of the most robust birth rates in the world. . . . countries with large numbers of Muslims have a crude birth rate of 42 per thousand; by contrast, the developed countries have a crude birth rate of just 13 per thousand.”

Needless to say, this rhetoric of sensible, restrained civilizations being overwhelmed by hordes of exorbitantly fertile Muslims has been used in the suppression of minorities worldwide, most recently by Hindu fundamentalists in India. Continuing his analysis of the consequences of Muslim immigration, Pipes writes, “Fears of a Muslim influx have more substance than the worry about jihad. West European societies are unprepared for the massive immigration of brown-skinned peoples cooking strange foods and not exactly maintaining Germanic standards of hygiene.” What might a decade ago have been castigated as a paranoid racist narrative of filth, pollution, and abjection was clearly viewed as significant multicultural scholarship by the Bush administration. In 2003 Bush nominated Pipes to be on the board of directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace. Despite massive opposition to Pipes’s nomination, Bush made a recess appointment after the Senate adjourned for the summer, thus allowing Pipes to serve a partial term. Colonial racial difference and Orientalism were thus legitimated as state policy.
Even as Bush was ostensibly differentiating good Iraqis from terrorists, tolerant Muslims from murderous fundamentalists, the neocons’ favorite book about the Arabs in the months leading to the Iraqi invasion was Raphael Patai’s *The Arab Mind*, first published in 1973. In its obsession with veiled women and its reduction of so diverse a geopolitical space as “the Arab world” to an undifferentiated, presocial sexual drive, Patai’s book is consistent with Orientalist representations of the oversexed, irrational, traditional Arab male. Patai argues, for instance, that resultant upon gender segregation and the veiling of women, sex became a “prime mental preoccupation in the Arab world.” However, despite the thorough condemnation of the book by scholars of Middle East studies, it is used as the definitive text on “the Arabs” for the military. Republished in 2002, it now has an enthusiastic introduction by Norvell “Tex” De Atkine, head of Middle East studies at Fort Bragg, who touts it as “essential reading.” “At the institution where I teach military officers, *The Arab Mind* forms the basis of my cultural instruction.” A clearer statement about the imbrication of Orientalism, schooling, and foreign policy can hardly be found.

Similarly, calls for the surveillance of Middle East studies and analyses of the pernicious influence of postcolonial theory and its putative founder, Edward Said, have relied securely on Orientalism. Perhaps the most powerful contemporary refashioning of Orientalism has been through the deployment of the terms terrorism and fundamentalism. Although, as Edward Said has pointed out, these categories generated out of the metropolitan centers of London and Washington became universally deployed, in the United States there has been a clear discursive consensus about what constitutes these categories, even as they lack definitional or logical clarity. Thus terrorism is never used to designate homegrown groups like the KKK that have indeed fomented terror, or groups like the Michigan Militia, who explicitly arm themselves against the state; abroad the term is almost never used in connection with right-wing Israeli groups who deliberately attack civilians. But Palestinians are routinely terrorists, particularly if they resist occupation. Similarly, fundamentalism signifies terrorism not when, say, antiabortion Christian fundamentalists intimidate women and murder physicians, but does so when a Muslim burns a U.S. flag.

The interpretation of the September 11 attacks as acts of terrorism against the values of freedom, and which needs no further analyses, has justified an endless war against terror that has included the preemptive invasion of Iraq. In such a scenario, September 11 signifies the vulnerability/insecurity of the homeland and the threat of terrorism. Stanley Kurtz’s testimony on behalf of the surveillance of Middle East studies, paradigmatic of similar calls for academic monitoring, artfully builds its argument upon a strategic deployment of these cultural metonyms. Thus
in his denunciation of the pernicious effects of postcolonial theory, Kurtz cites the assigning of writings by postcolonial intellectuals such as Tariq Ali and Arundhati Roy to K–12 teachers in order for them to understand the question “Why do they hate us?” Such readings, argues Kurtz, betray an “extreme animus to the United States,” indicative of the “extremist political bias” of Title VI programs dominated by Said’s postcolonial theory. As Kurtz easily slides from “extreme” to “extremism” in his characterization of Said, postcolonial theory, and Middle East studies, all arguably directed against the nation, he evokes the specter of terrorism and the crazed Arab/Muslim/Middle Easterner without having to evoke these appellations in a racist manner. Thus Said is deemed a terrorist not because he is Arab, which would be racist, but because he is extremist, presenting an immutable cultural difference of the likes propounded by Huntington. Of course, as Said himself had demonstrated, irrationality and extremism have long been used as euphemistic racial markers of a backward Arab world in contrast to a rational West.

Kurtz’s testimony, in fact, repeats the narrative of nation most favored by the state since 9/11—a classic three-part Aristotelian drama with the actions of the terrorists disturbing the peace; the destruction of September 11 signifying national vulnerability and terrorist brutality; and the need for security apparatuses to protect the homeland. Invoked by the state as a justification of the invasion of Iraq, the tripartite drama also structures Kurtz’s testimony. Thus the first part of the testimony is replete with references to “extremism” (used six times), which stands in for terrorism; the second evokes the tragedy of 9/11 (referred to nine times) and exhorts academic knowledge to serve state policy; and the third underlines the urgency of “security” (mentioned four times). Membership within the nation is thus constructed as the need for personal security acquired through loyalty to the figure of the president, who stands in for father/law, providing the security of the symbolic. That this security can be acquired at the expense of the social justice network of social security, as argued by George W. Bush, is the paradoxical logic of fear that justifies imperialism and its discursive ally, Orientalism.

Given the enormous role of culture and knowledge production in the apparatus of imperialism, it is imperative that academics, particularly those involved in the analysis and understanding of culture, be vigilant of right-wing attempts to take over or contain public discourse. Systematically defunded universities need not necessarily become allies of empire. Instead, they should strive to produce intellectuals whose role is “to present alternative narratives and other perspectives on history than those provided by combatants on behalf of official memory and national identity and mission.” At present, the best hope for these alternative narratives is a
committed postcolonial perspective that takes seriously the brutal histories of colonialism and imperialism that continue to structure our lives.

Notes

4. Ibid., ix.
5. I am referring to Foucault’s 1978 essay that posits governmentality as the late capitalist way in which states operate. Governmentality operates through a diffuse set of strategies — policies, departments, institutions, discourses — that work to regulate bodies and reproduce subjects for the state. See Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” reprinted in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104. Agamben identifies the state of exception that allows modern states to engage in a legal civil war, thus silencing adversaries through a permanent state of emergency, as the established way contemporary societies have operated since the end of World War I. See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1–4.
14. For the importance of the denial of coevalness, see Johannes Fabian, Time


17. Hajjar and Niva, “(Re)Made in the USA.”


20. My argument about the effects of the migration of third-world scholars applies mainly to the humanities and social sciences and not to business or hard and applied sciences, where many faculty have willingly recruited themselves as agents of U.S. neoliberalism.


35. Horowitz, “The Campus Blacklist.”
40. Horowitz, “The Campus Blacklist.”
41. Ibid.
44. Thus Howard Dean, critic of the Iraqi invasion since its inception, was cast in an ad by the conservative Club for Growth as somehow lacking American- ness and associated with signifiers of foreignness. Dean was advised to take his “tax-hiking, government expanding, latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo driving, New York Times–reading, Hollywood loving, left-wing freak show back to Vermont where it belongs.” George W. Bush, on the other hand, claimed cultural authenticity by casting himself as cowboy who in true Western style promised the nation to “smoke out” Osama. Cited in Thomas Frank, *What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), 17.
45. Statement of Stanley Kurtz.
46. Horowitz, “The Campus Blacklist.”
52. Ibid.
57. My discussion of Patai’s book also appears in Dawson and Schueller, *Exceptional State*.

