It would have been conventional to have begun an essay on academic freedom by listing the blatant attempts by the Right to use 9/11 as a pretext for curbing political dissent in academia. After all, Lynne Cheney’s American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), Daniel Pipes’s Campus Watch, David Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights, Students for Academic Freedom (SAF), and the David Project sprang into existence shortly after 9/11, and inquisitions geared toward firing subversive faculty such as Ward Churchill are still in process as we write this. But although these blatant encroachments on academia are undeniable and occasion this special issue, the rhetoric of contemporary apocalypse obfuscates the importance historically attached to the university both as a site of cultural, economic, and political reproduction and as a vehicle of social change. Writing in response to right-wing attacks on what was dubbed “political correctness,” Martha Nussbaum saw universities as cultivating humanity and world citizenship through the liberal educational tradition of Socratic questioning and critical inquiry.¹ Comparing U.S. universities to those abroad, Nussbaum argued, “In most nations students enter a university to pursue a single subject, and that is all they study. The idea of a ‘liberal education’—a higher education that is a cultivation of the whole human being for the functions of citizenship and life generally—has been taken up most fully in the United States.”² The mission of the university is thus to produce citizens who can transcend the dogmas of the nation-state; and yet, ironically, Nussbaum constructs her argument through a narrative of exceptional national education. In the heyday of the Cold War, when twenty-five presidents of America’s most prestigious universities released a policy statement on academic freedom, the prevailing conception of the role of universities in the nation was what John Guillory would associate with school culture—projecting an imaginary cultural unity never coincident with the messy culture of the nation-state.³ The document declared that American universities “have equipped our people with the varied skills and sciences essential to the development of a pioneer country. They have imparted the shape and coherence of the American nation to formless immigrant groups. Ameri-
In virtually all cases, formulations of academic freedom by academic organizations were made in the interest of professionalism rather than in support of progressive social visions. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, reformist economists were faced with dismissal from their institutions for espousing the causes of labor or questioning privatization. In 1894 Richard T. Ely, a major founder of the American Economic Association (AEA) and a proponent of his discipline as a vehicle of social reform, was attacked by the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents for supporting strikes and boycotts in his popular publications. Instead of defending his freedom to espouse the causes he supported, Ely chose to disprove the regents’ charges by demonstrating the essential conservatism of his ideas. The regents not only reinstated Ely but, significantly, did so while affirming their commitment to academic freedom. Thus academic freedom as a highly delimited conception of academic behavior won the day. Exactly the opposite resulted in the case of Ely’s reformist student Edward W. Bemis, who refused to heed the warning of the University of Chicago president to “exercise care in public utterance about questions that are agitating the minds of the people.” Bemis, who remained outspoken in his advocacy of the public ownership of railroads and utilities, was fired, but unlike in Ely’s case, his competence as a faculty member was questioned. Thus, argues Ellen W. Schrecker, “The concept of academic freedom became a useful way to describe in ostensibly professional terms the permissible limits of political dissent. It created an intellectually defensible zone of political autonomy for the professoriat, which . . . was sufficiently circumscribed so as to exclude as unscholarly whatever political behavior the leading members of

can ideals have been strengthened, the great cultural tradition of the West has been broadened, and enriched by their teaching and example.”

Our point is that both liberal reformers and craven administrators have viewed universities as crucial in the formation of a citizenry compliant with dominant conceptions of national identity. Little wonder, then, that in times of crisis, there are renewed calls for universities to simply act as functionaries of the military-industrial complex, as ideological state apparatuses maintaining the race, class, and gender status quo, and as conduits of doctrinaire nationalism.

The concept of academic freedom has been articulated in the American university in response to specific attacks on the university’s putative freedom to be unnational, to dissent from popular narratives of nation. At times the formulation of academic freedom principles has been highly jingoistic, while at others, it has been circumscribed by resort to a public-private split that has been the bedrock of traditional liberalism, with its race and class hierarchies, and implicitly opposed to the concept of a radically situated self that minorities, of necessity, embody. In virtually all cases, formulations of academic freedom by academic organizations were made in the interest of professionalism rather than in support of progressive social visions. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, reformist economists were faced with dismissal from their institutions for espousing the causes of labor or questioning privatization. In 1894 Richard T. Ely, a major founder of the American Economic Association (AEA) and a proponent of his discipline as a vehicle of social reform, was attacked by the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents for supporting strikes and boycotts in his popular publications. Instead of defending his freedom to espouse the causes he supported, Ely chose to disprove the regents’ charges by demonstrating the essential conservatism of his ideas. The regents not only reinstated Ely but, significantly, did so while affirming their commitment to academic freedom. Thus academic freedom as a highly delimited conception of academic behavior won the day. Exactly the opposite resulted in the case of Ely’s reformist student Edward W. Bemis, who refused to heed the warning of the University of Chicago president to “exercise care in public utterance about questions that are agitating the minds of the people.” Bemis, who remained outspoken in his advocacy of the public ownership of railroads and utilities, was fired, but unlike in Ely’s case, his competence as a faculty member was questioned. Thus, argues Ellen W. Schrecker, “The concept of academic freedom became a useful way to describe in ostensibly professional terms the permissible limits of political dissent. It created an intellectually defensible zone of political autonomy for the professoriat, which . . . was sufficiently circumscribed so as to exclude as unscholarly whatever political behavior the leading members of
the academic community feared might trigger outside intervention.” As these early cases of academic freedom demonstrate, academics outside the classroom were urged either to remain apolitical private citizens or adopt public personae that did not question the status quo.

It was the firing of noted economist Edward Ross from Stanford University in response to directives from Mrs. Leland Stanford, who objected to his stand on the importation of cheap Asian labor, that led philosopher Arthur O. Lovejoy to join with John Dewey fifteen years later to form the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) to ensure academic freedom for faculty and to author the “1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.” Key to the document was the distinction of the university from a business venture and of teaching from private employment. Faculty members were not employees in the ordinary sense because “in the essentials of his [a faculty member’s] professional activity his duty is to the wider public to which the institution itself is morally amenable.” Although the declaration charts the three components of academic freedom, “freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance and action,” the contradictory imperatives of rights and responsibilities for the concept of freedom of extramural utterance causes the authors to postpone its discussion to the future.

A similar conflict pervades the 1940 “Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,” the most widely accepted document on academic freedom. Like the 1915 statement, this one, while attempting to carve out an autonomous sphere for academics, is as much about limitations as freedom. It articulates a tense relationship between the university and the nation, with the university at once an active public sphere organization, a conduit for the nation’s health, an institution for social good, and, simultaneously, a sphere of learning apart from the business of daily living, premised on a separation between public and private. The document begins by symbiotically linking universities to the society at large. Universities are “conducted for the common good and not to further the interests of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.” Academic freedom, it argues, “is essential to these purposes.” It continues, however, to define rules of behavior through adherence to a professionalism that delimits codes of conduct. “College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their profession...
Academic freedom defined as appropriate restraint becomes a means of curbing dissent, particularly in highly charged periods such as wartime. This restraint led the academic community to collaborate with McCarthyism by accepting the legitimacy of congressional committees and investigators wanting to purge American universities of communists. As Schrecker suggests, supposedly higher values like “institutional loyalty and national security” overrode the values of their calling. Thus in their 1953 statement, a group of university presidents supported the scholar’s mission of the “examination of unpopular ideas, of ideas considered abhorrent and even dangerous,” described the university as a unique, nonprofit structure, different from a corporation, and yet saw loyalty to the nation-state and free enterprise as essential to the university. “They [American universities] are united in loyalty to the ideal of learning, to the moral code, to the country and its form of government.” Membership in the Communist Party, they categorically stated, “extinguishes the right to a university position.”

But despite the purges of the 1950s and the massive increase in state funding of research following World War II, the U.S. university retained its relative autonomy as an organ of civil society, privileged as separate space through the establishment of tenure. Thus teaching and research at universities also continued the mission of “searching for truth” and the avocation of professors to work for the “common good.” One example will serve to make our point. William F. Buckley’s rantings about the advocacy of collectivism and Marxism by the Yale economics department faculty and their apparent disregard for the values of donor alumni and corporate trustees is a heartening endorsement of academic freedom and a chilling prognostication of the corporate pressures to which universities are increasingly subject. Buckley argues that the “faculty of Yale is morally and constitutionally responsible to the trustees of Yale, who are in turn responsible to the alumni, and thus duty bound to transmit to their students the wisdom, insight, and value judgments which in the trustees’ opinion will enable the American citizen to make the optimum adjustment to the community and to the world.”

John Chamberlain, in
his introduction to the book, makes clear his insistence that knowledge production be commodified: “Should the right to pursue the truth be constructed as a right to inculcate values that deny the value-judgments of the customer who is paying the bills of education? Must the customer, in the name of Academic Freedom, be compelled to take a product which he may consider defective? . . . Does Yale Corporation, which represents the education-buying customer, want any such thing?”¹⁷ For evidence of the propagation of socialism, Buckley cites, for instance, his lecture notes from Professor Lindblom’s economics course in which Lindblom assaulted the concept of private property, “which he stated, no enlightened society, no reputable philosopher, can uphold.”¹⁸ In sum, Yale, while being supported by Christian individualists, attempts to turn the children of these supporters into atheist socialists, in part through adherence to a Keynesian collectivism.¹⁹

Yet it is imperative that we remind ourselves that these battles around academic freedom were largely conflicts among white males. Minorities did not have the freedom to enter the ranks of academia and engage in skirmishes about academic freedom. Even at their best, functioning like individuals in the Socratic “Think-Academy” idealized by Nussbaum, their conversations excluded the African American population. Bill Mullen’s discussion of W. E. B. Du Bois and African American education in this special issue highlights the historical limits of the postwar promise of universal education. Through a reading of Du Bois’s *The Education of Black People*, Mullen demonstrates how Du Bois came to see universalist education doctrines and conceptions of academic freedom based on free speech as constitutive elements of capitalist white supremacy, with working-class African Americans functioning as the originary “exclusion” of Western humanism. But, although blacks were literally excluded from faculty ranks and comprised only 5 percent of all full-time faculty even by the end of the twentieth century, the impact to higher education of the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s and 1970s cannot be underestimated.²⁰ As the emergence of community colleges increased minority enrollment and northern institutions began recruiting black students, campuses diversified. Radicalized by the Vietnam War, minority students such as those in the Third World Movement of 1968 articulated connections between imperialism abroad and the repression of people of color, the wretched of the earth, at home; among their demands were the employment of minority faculty as well as the creation of new programs such as ethnic studies and African American studies. Mass higher education, viewed as essential to economic competitiveness and national security, was generating levels of dissent conservatives have since attempted to curb. But while universities such as Stanford attempted to stifle dissidence by firing faculty like
H. Bruce Franklin who dared to publicly proclaim the relationship between capitalist power, imperialism, and racism, entire fields of study such as American history (to take just one example) were thoroughly changed.\textsuperscript{21} Revisionist historians such as William Appleman Williams gave legitimacy to the study of U.S. imperialism while others pursued history from below. Similarly, former racist histories of the Reconstruction were challenged by historians such as John Hope Franklin and Eric Foner. By the time Howard Zinn published \textit{A People’s History of the United States} in 1980, there was a wider public that had been touched by this new history. In the next fifteen years, Zinn’s book went through 25 printings and sold more than 400,000 copies.\textsuperscript{22} A similar reception was to be accorded Edward Said’s \textit{Orientalism} (1978), which ushered in the field of postcolonial studies in the U.S. academy and which, to the consternation of the neocons today, changed the direction of Middle East studies from simply being an alibi for U.S. foreign policy, a transformation addressed by Malini Johar Schueller in her essay.

The conservative reaction to this mounting politicization of academia was swift. In June 1969, recently elected president Richard Nixon delivered a speech at a public college in South Dakota in which he linked “drugs, crime, campus revolts, racial discord, [and] draft resistance” and lamented the loss of integrity in academia: “We have long considered our colleges and universities citadels of freedom, where the rule of reason prevails. Now both the process of freedom and the rule of reason are under attack.”\textsuperscript{23} Despite Nixon’s prominent role in the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings early in his career, the conservative counteroffensive against the campus movement did not follow the script of the McCarthy era. Instead, the right-wing strategy for dealing with dissenting students and faculty was built on a memorandum penned by future Nixon Supreme Court nominee Lewis Powell. In an August 1971 letter titled “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” Powell wrote to his friends at the National Chamber of Commerce to decry the liberal establishment’s “appeasement” of anticapitalist sentiment on campuses around the United States.\textsuperscript{24} It was high time, Powell argued, that business learned how to fight back against charismatic radicals such as Herbert Marcuse, whose influence he believed was corrupting an entire generation. Powell argued that the chamber should begin its campaign by establishing a stable of social scientists whose work would articulate procorporate perspectives in the public sphere. In addition, the chamber should aggressively insist on “equal time” for “independent scholars who do believe in the system” at campus speaking engagements. Finally, however, Powell conceded that the fundamental problem—the “imbalance of many [academic] faculties”—would take time to repair:
Correcting this is indeed a long-range and difficult project. Yet, it should be taken as a part of an overall program. This would mean the urging of the need for faculty balance upon university administrators and boards of trustees. The methods to be employed require careful thought, and the obvious pitfalls must be avoided. Improper pressure would be counterproductive. But the basic concepts of balance, fairness, and truth are difficult to resist, if properly presented to boards of trustees, by writing and speaking, and by appeals to alumni associations and groups. This is a long road and not one for the fainthearted.\textsuperscript{25}

Powell’s memorandum spread like wildfire through America’s corporate boardrooms. Not only did it clearly identify a pivotal ideological struggle, it also advanced a sustainable strategy for changing campus culture, one that did not rely on the discredited tactics of government-sponsored witch hunts that typified the McCarthy era. Rather than simply seeking to clamp down on wayward organizations such as the Modern Language Association (MLA), in other words, Powell advised that the corporate elite fund the work of intellectuals who would engage in what Antonio Gramsci called a “war of position” against critics of U.S. policies, both foreign and domestic, and of the capitalist world system in general. Powell’s memo has been plausibly credited with stimulating the foundation of such pivotal right-wing think tanks as the Heritage Foundation, the Manhattan Institute, the Cato Institute, and Accuracy in Academe, each of which, while producing pundits of dubious value such as Dinesh D’Souza and David Horowitz, has achieved dramatic success in swaying public policy over the last couple of decades. Within a decade, these “independent” institutions began bankrolling a seemingly endless series of increasingly vitriolic studies attacking “multiculturalism” and other curricular residues of the social movements of the 1960s, with their commitments to racial, gender, and class equality and their opposition to the United States’ imperial designs around the world.\textsuperscript{26} Not surprisingly, spokespeople for these institutions have lambasted the likes of Ward Churchill. These “culture wars” helped to isolate and delegitimize the critical voices emanating from the academy, allaying the fears of conservatives that campus dissent might serve as the lodestone for a broader transformation of American society.

Equally if not more significantly, however, the Powell memo planted the seeds for the structural transformation of U.S. higher education. Along with a bevy of other initiatives, Powell’s suggestions for an ideological assault on antagonists of free enterprise laid the foundations for the new modes of political-economic governance now referred to as neoliberalism, and with them the rolling back of many aspects of the Keynesian welfare state, including the mass university.\textsuperscript{27} Central to this now hegemonic doc-
trine, of course, is antagonism toward all forms of state intervention, which were represented as a damper on innate human forms of entrepreneurial energy and freedom except in the form of incentives to corporations. Predictably, affirmative action was out, corporate subsidies were in. Although neoliberal programs were consolidated in an uneven and often piecemeal fashion around the world, one central venue for their implementation has been U.S. higher education.28 By 1978, for example, despite Powell’s bitter attack on liberal appeasers in the corporate ranks, the different factions of U.S. capital had successfully united forces to establish the Business–Higher Education Forum, an organization designed to smooth the blossoming détente between corporate and academic executive officers.29 Under the new, Darwinian regime of racist academic capitalism, the humanities and significant segments of the social sciences, post-1968 harbors of antisystemic thinking, atrophied as state funding of education was slashed and professional schools became increasingly central to the mission of the university while also becoming far more fiscally autonomous. Fields influenced by the social movements of the 1960s were particularly vulnerable. The new neoliberal academic regime choked off many spaces of ideological and demographic inclusion carved within the mass university by withdrawing funds from dissenting fields and imposing crushing tuition charges that rendered education increasingly onerous for working-class, ethnic minority, and immigrant students. While the percentage of minority students in public universities has increased during the neoliberal era, the conditions under which students study have deteriorated significantly. These changes did not, moreover, simply affect the liberal arts and “soft” sciences; in addition, the tradition of open scientific investigation was also seriously compromised as measures such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 opened the door to the patenting of research in the sciences. As Andrew Ross discusses in this special issue, such moves placed proprietary corporate culture at the heart of the research university, leading to significant conflicts of interest and raising questions concerning academia’s dedication to the public good. Drawing on his recent research in China, Ross argues that the future of academia is presaged by the forms of domestic subcontracting and corporate offshoring that increasingly prevail in other occupations. Of course, this new regime of academic capitalism seriously compromises academic freedom by radically undermining many pivotal forms of professional autonomy.

In addition, the imposition of corporate models of knowledge production has also entailed the widespread casualization of teaching within postsecondary education. While academic administrators have continued to mouth the rhetoric of pedagogical excellence, over the last thirty years they have adopted cost-cutting measures that shift a significant percent-
age of teaching onto the backs of ill-paid and often insecure adjuncts and graduate students. Although statistics are notoriously unreliable as a result of underreporting by the Department of Education, contingent faculty members currently teach nearly 50 percent of college and university courses nationwide. Not only do such “flexible” faculty members not enjoy any of the protections for academic freedom afforded by tenure, but they are seldom fully included in organs of collective bargaining or self-governance such as faculty unions and senates. As research has become increasingly important for professional advancement over the last three decades, this army of surplus instructors has grown, leaving higher education split into a core of senior faculty, who cling tenaciously to their withering perquisites, and a ballooning population of peripheral employees. The contingent status of the latter not only eats away at the life chances of adjunct faculty, but also fosters a climate of anxiety that helps tame dissent even among those who are tenured and supposedly “secure.” When the number of contingent faculty increases, the ability of the faculty as a whole to direct its own affairs diminishes; administrators gain power and adopt an increasingly supercilious attitude toward institutions of faculty self-governance, eroding the basic institutions of institutional autonomy and academic freedom.

If, as Philippa Strum has argued, we cannot bank on the “freedom of expression” component of academic freedom given the juridical vacillation of bodies such as the Supreme Court during the war on terror, neither should we expect professional norms to offer enduring shelter from this storm. The structural transformation of U.S. higher education affected by academic capitalism has seen such norms significantly weakened by the proletarianization of the teaching staff. Indeed, as Vijay Prashad argues in this special issue, now more than ever the academic Left cannot rely on institutional protection alone for its adversarial positions, but must instead engage in a broader campaign within the public sphere that seeks to remind citizens of the value of academia’s (relative) autonomy. Prashad points to the history of attacks on academics who affiliated with any form of collective action, suggesting that this history reflects a flawed liberal model of academic freedom based on critique that affirms the status quo rather than seeks systemic change. To overcome this tame if not supine tradition, the academic Left, Prashad argues, must defend itself through the social force of its ideas rather than through recourse to the individual’s right to free expression. Indeed, as the militant resuscitation of Lewis Powell’s calls for “balance” by opportunistic post-9/11 neoconservative groups such as Students for Academic Freedom (SAF) underlines, doctrines of free expression can be just as easily invoked by those seeking to curtail countersystemic research and teaching as by its proponents.
not do to impose too seamless a genealogy for contemporary assaults on academic freedom, neither should we ignore the place of contemporary calls for balance within a carefully formulated and slowly germinating political strategy.

Despite this history of strategic unity, the attacks on academic freedom waged by diverse private advocacy groups since 9/11 have been multifaceted. Consequently, no single collection of essays is likely to cover the many cases, angles, and issues raised by these attacks. We seek in this special issue, however, to open a number of lines of investigation and intervention that cluster around what we see as three of the main areas in which academic freedom is at stake: ad hominem attacks by private advocacy groups on individuals dealing with controversial areas of curriculum; changes in governmental regulations of knowledge production in the United States, particularly in terms of encroaching legislative control over area studies; and the vulnerability to outside pressure that results from the increasing commodification of academia. Each of these areas overlaps and is interrelated. For example, post-9/11 private advocacy groups such as SAF have not simply attacked individuals, they have also begun legislative campaigns at both state and national levels that have been quickly embraced by neoconservative legislators as well as by members of the Christian Right intent on challenging the teaching of evolution. As a result, any neat distinction between private groups and legislative efforts collapses quickly. Similarly, the campaign by private advocacy groups to regulate prominent grant-giving organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations ends up using some of the same language employed in government pronouncements about the war on terror. Furthermore, as the corporatization of the academy proceeds apace, not only is there less and less ground for resistance to the efforts of both private pressure groups and government regulators, but outside groups gain more of a hand in actually running the show. Attacks on individual professors, in other words, need to be seen in the broader context of two major trends: the Manichaean neoconservative ideology with its uncomplicated patriotism, its visions of world dominance, its unqualified commitment to hard-line pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian policies, and its acceptance of a “clash of civilizations” thesis; and the neoliberal political-economic forces that have circulated throughout the public sphere over the last thirty years. Ashley Dawson’s essay for this special issue discusses the confluence of these two trends during the spring 2005 crisis at Columbia University. As his essay suggests, successful resistance to these attacks must derive not simply from opposition to ad hominem attacks on individuals, but through challenges to the broader context that animates these attacks.

Although the conjunction of neoconservative and neoliberal forces
we have traced here represents many formidable obstacles, the glaringly evident setbacks to area studies help open significant lines of contention in the attack on academic freedom and on dissenting voices more broadly. As Malini Johar Schueller’s essay documents, many of these contradictions cluster around Middle Eastern studies, a field in which the limits of the present administration’s Manichaean doctrines are playing themselves out in a particularly vicious form, indeed in a wholesale attack on the culture of civil rights. While neoconservatives have seemed particularly strong in seeking to muzzle critics in this area, the developing debacle in the Middle East, like the one in Vietnam thirty years ago, is likely to strengthen rather than undermine critical voices. In addition, despite their rhetoric of impartiality, the many private advocacy groups that have attacked individual professors and academic freedom in general since 9/11 have forgotten Lewis Powell’s injunction to avoid draconian governmental inquisitions. These groups have resorted to relatively transparent attempts to impose external, politically motivated controls on academia in order to silence critical analysis. This strategy offers evidence of a heavy-handed attempt to quash civil liberties that has catalyzed significant resistance in U.S. history; in fact, none of these legislative initiatives have passed into law. Similarly, as Ward Churchill’s blow-by-blow account of the national campaign against him demonstrates, such ad hominem attacks have had limited success. Indeed, Churchill’s essay in this issue documents the extent to which such attacks can provide a rallying point for advocates of civil liberties in general as well as academic freedom.

These defeats for the new McCarthyism should not blind us to the perils we confront. The climate for academic freedom, and the intellectual analysis and dissent that it underwrites, is worse today than at any other time in the last fifty years. In 2005, for instance, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, in language closely following the Academic Bill of Rights, passed a resolution creating a special committee charged with investigating faculty hiring and promotion. Faculty like Douglas Giles can be fired for simply allowing discussion on Palestine in the classroom, even when the topic is germane to the course. As we go to press, the Ward Churchill inquisition is still unfolding. It is vital that the academic community engage in heightened collective resistance to these various ad hominem attacks and institutional purges through professional organizations such as the AAUP and the MLA, through organs of collective governance such as faculty senates, and through units of collective bargaining like faculty and staff unions. In addition, we need to resist the efforts of putative liberals such as Stanley Fish who see universities as bastions of neutrality and excoriate those who attempt to align the structure of universities to visions of social justice. Commenting on various calls for divestment and the policing of
workshops that supply sweatshirts to campuses, Fish writes, “It is the obligation of the investment managers to secure the best possible returns; it is not their obligation to secure political or economic justice. They may wish to do those things as private citizens or as members of an investment club, but as university officers their duty is to expand the endowment by any legal means available.” A clearer case of enlisting universities as agents for corporate exploitation can hardly be found. We therefore reject Robert Post’s argument that freedom of extramural expression be separated from the idea of academic freedom. Against such moves to mollify the inquisitors, we need to remind ourselves that the production of knowledge in the academy cannot be delinked from questions of social justice (what the AAUP has called the “common good” and duty to the “wider public”) and that the “search for truth” requires an engagement with political issues that questions the public/private, scholar/citizen divide. In an eloquent injunction that questions what Andrew Ross aptly terms fundamentalism about academic freedom, Howard Zinn writes: “To me, academic freedom has always meant the right to insist that freedom be more than academic—that the university, because of its special claim to be a place for the pursuit of truth, be a place where we can challenge not only the ideas but the institutions, the practices of society, measuring them against millennia-old ideals of equality and justice.” Rejecting the argument of staying in one’s field and leaving questions of politics, racial oppression, and class exploitation to others as a ploy to support the status quo in the name of professionalism, Zinn instead urges social activism: “The theorist of radical change, who does not act in the real world of social combat is teaching, by example, the most sophisticated technique of safety.”

Notes

2. Ibid., 9.

7. Ibid., 16.

8. Ibid., 14.


10. Ibid., 299–300.


12. Ibid.


19. Ibid., lx, 88.


25. The full text of the Powell memorandum is available at www.reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate_accountability/powell_memo_lewis.html.

27. For a discussion of neoliberalism’s origins and development, see David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).


33. The Web site of the Project for the New American Century demonstrates the clear imperial ambitions set forth by the necons. See www.newamericancentury.org.


37. Ibid, 16.